In other cases, ISPs interfere with the SSL encrypted traffic between Cloudflare’s Point-of-Presence in Cairo and the backend servers of sites ( psiphon.ca, and ) hosted outside of Egypt. In some cases, instead of RST injection, ISPs drop packets, suggesting a variance in filtering rules. Rather than serving block pages (which would have provided a notification of the blocking), Egyptian Internet Service Providers (ISP) appear to primarily block sites through the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology that resets connections. 178 of which consistently presented a high ratio of HTTP failures, strongly suggesting that they were blocked. Throughout the testing period, between January 2017 to May 2018, more than 1,000 URLs presented network anomalies. This post and the full report have been published by OONI, a censorship measurement project under the Tor Project, and Egypt’s Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE).
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